The Trump administration’s America First doctrine claims to operate under the principle of “peace through strength”, an idea with roots in ancient history. Strength has always been essential to maintaining peace and stability in international relations. A nation unable to enforce its will cannot deter enemies or shape global events in its favor. However, some of the administration’s early actions raise a crucial question: how does this version of America First define strength?
A Strategy of Intimidation
Before taking office, Trump launched a social media campaign advocating for the acquisition of Greenland. After his inauguration, he reportedly had a tense exchange with Denmark’s Prime Minister over the issue. His administration made enough threats and disparaging remarks about Canada to contribute to Justin Trudeau’s exit as Prime Minister while joking about annexing Canada as a U.S. state. He also floated the idea of reclaiming control of the Panama Canal, through force if necessary.
Supporters argue that these moves reflect a renewed focus on the Western Hemisphere, aiming to strengthen America’s position in the Arctic and counter China’s growing influence in Latin America. The alleged logic behind these moves makes sense. If the world is shifting toward a multipolar order, the United States should strengthen its position in its own region. There are legitimate concerns about Arctic control, as both China and Russia have expanded their presence in the area. Even discussions about adding new states—Greenland, Canada, Puerto Rico, or Panama—would be welcome if those territories expressed genuine interest.
However, why start with hostility? Why lead with threats, intimidation, and reckless accusations? If America First considers this strength, it is indistinguishable from bullying. The administration argues that funding Ukraine to resist Russian aggression is a waste of taxpayer dollars, yet it simultaneously believes China will be deterred by America metaphorically taking Canada’s lunch money. This worldview mistakes bravado for strength.
Chaos as a Foreign Policy Strategy
Trump’s approach to international relations during his first administration relied on unpredictability rather than strength. He seems intent on repeating that strategy in his second term. Keeping other nations “on their toes” can be effective in certain situations, but it is a poor foundation for long-term foreign policy success. Eventually, someone will call the bluff—or worse it’s not a bluff, and unnecessary conflicts will emerge. Even if no direct confrontation occurs, the damage to alliances and relationships with non-aligned nations could have lasting consequences.
As I previously discussed in Democracy’s Sisyphus, embracing a multipolar world does not mean accepting American decline. It could allow the United States to maintain a leadership role in a way that is both more financially sustainable and more acceptable to the American public. However, stability in such a system depends on adversaries knowing that any challenge to order will be met with a coalition response. That requires willing partners to join a coalition—partners that an unnecessarily aggressive America First alienates.
Short-Term Wins and Long-Term Losses
Trump may succeed in achieving some of his objectives. If Greenland ends up on a path to statehood or if the United States secures a favorable agreement on the Panama Canal, those outcomes would benefit American interests. Trump would undoubtedly celebrate them as personal victories. Yet, if these goals are achieved, it is unlikely that hostility and bluster played a necessary role in making them happen.
Meanwhile, the obsession with bravado distracts from more pressing strategic challenges. China is on the verge of operating a “megaport” in Peru and has used its Belt and Road Initiative to entrench itself in South America. Its economic and political ties with Brazil continue to strengthen. Central and South American nations observing Trump’s chaotic diplomacy may reasonably conclude that working with China, a more predictable partner is in their best interest. China will be happy to oblige. America First’s disdain for foreign aid, transactional approach to diplomacy, and tendency to view allies as freeloaders make it difficult to execute the slow, low-profile, and sometimes costly actions that underpin long-term geopolitical relationships. The State Department still employs capable professionals who can navigate these challenges, but making their jobs harder serves no strategic purpose.
For example, a recent Senate hearing on the Panama Canal highlighted a complicated situation shaped by several U.S. missteps. American companies often fail to secure bids in Latin America, and for four years, the United States lacked a permanent ambassador to Panama, relying instead on a series of interim Chargé d'Affaires. Complex issues such as these require nuanced solutions, which diplomacy driven by social media wins and headlines cannot provide.
Trump and America First reject the notion that the United States operates in a multipolar world. Instead, they believe that more strength—defined narrowly as power projection and economic coercion—will preserve American primacy without the need for allies, only business associates.
On the eve of World War I, Theodore Roosevelt warned about this very mindset:
The Government of Prussianized Germany for the last forty-three years has behaved in such fashion as inevitably to make almost every nation with which it came in contact its foe, because it has convinced everybody except Austria that it has no regard for anything except its own interest, and that it will enter instantly on any career of aggression with cynical brutality and bad faith if it thinks its interest requires such action.
When a nation treats everyone as an adversary, it inevitably creates more enemies. The United States already has powerful and legitimate threats to confront—there is no strategic advantage in making more amongst nations that would willingly be your allies.
For every Scut Farkus and Grover Dill there is, eventually, a Ralphie waiting to punch them in the face.