Multipolar Chaos

America First foreign policy is moving toward a new world order in the worst way possible

Highlights:

• The United States is stumbling into a chaotic transition to a multipolar world instead of executing a deliberate strategy.

• Rather than strengthening Europe as an independent pole, the Trump administration is both criticizing and undermining it.

• Trump’s strategy or lack thereof is depriving the US of the opportunity to strengthen its hand in the emerging multipolar order

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Multipolar Chaos

I have previously written about the potential benefits of transitioning to a multipolar system in a deliberate and planned manner. But after the disastrous Oval Office exchange between President Trump and President Zelensky—along with other telling signs and comments—it seems the United States is making the transition via a flurry of emotion and chaos instead.

Trump and his supporters clearly see the war in Ukraine as the last vestiges of a bygone era and that may be true. If the United States wanted an orderly transition to a multipolar world that brings the benefits most Americans now seem to favor, the war in Ukraine has the potential to solidify the principle of burden sharing—especially in demonstrating how poles could share the key burden of deterring aggression.

A Multipolar World

In a multipolar order, the world will have poles, core states, and periphery nations. Core states will have a clear loyalty or preference toward a certain pole. Periphery nations may have mixed or shifting loyalties, shaped by political or geographic concerns that prevent full alignment with one pole or another. For example, the United States may see South Korea as solidly within its sphere of influence, while the Philippines may remain a periphery nation and a potential point of contention.

Ukraine exists on the periphery. It is not a core nation within the general European sphere of influence—though it would like to be. Historically, it was within Russia’s sphere but doesn’t want to be anymore. This makes it a key friction point between two poles—or in this case, between a pole and a potential pole.

This could have been—and still could be—a great opportunity to move Europe toward functioning as a pole in its own right, rather than an extension of America’s sphere of influence. That would enable true burden sharing, largely independent of U.S. assistance. However, as I have previously pointed out, Europe’s military subservience was not born of incompetence but of intentional U.S. policy. Consequently, Europe is not yet ready to function independently as a pole. The war in Ukraine has exposed serious gaps in Europe’s cooperation and capabilities—alongside some of its strengths. If the United States acted as a partner, it could use this moment as a springboard to offload some security burdens while still maintaining global stability.

The United States and Europe could have used the lessons of Ukraine to map out a transition plan. Short-, medium-, and long-term strategies should have been created to set expectations for Europe’s new role as a secondary but substantial pole of its own, rather than a core state within an American-led pole.

1923 Map of Europe (Library of Congress)

From Bad to Worse

Instead, the Biden administration clung to the notion of Europe as an extension of a unipolar world. Now, the Trump administration is taking things from bad to worse. The United States has sent mixed signals on whether Europe would even participate in negotiations—when it should have been pushing for inclusion, if not insisting on Europe leading. As with all things Trump, rather than working with Europe, his administration has made wild accusations and repeatedly undervalued European contributions. They are simultaneously criticizing Europe for not being a pole and undermining its ability to become one.

Europe is being forced to grow in strength out of neglect and chaos. They appear to be trying to take the lead in negotiations. They are increasing military spending—facing an administration that doesn’t just expect them to quickly become an equal partner, but one that seems to want to punish them for not having done so ten years ago.

If the United States supported Europe’s growth into a more effective pole, it would reinforce the idea that aggressors will be met by multiple poles, ensuring that aggression is not rewarded. This lesson would pay dividends in the future. Instead, when asked about Russian-occupied Ukrainian territory, Trump suggested Russia should keep it as a reward for battlefield losses: “They took a lot of land, they fought for that land, they lost a lot of soldiers.” His administration has tried to muddy the waters about Russia’s role as the aggressor. And in an embarrassing display, Trump berated the victim of aggression—on television, for all the world to see—for not being grateful enough.

Now, Trump loyalists are increasingly calling for the United States to leave NATO, making the abandonment of Europe official. That move would be a death blow to burden sharing and collective deterrence.

Any doubt about the administration’s negative impact on deterrence is quickly erased simply by looking at how the aggressors are reacting. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov put it bluntly:

The new administration is rapidly changing all foreign policy configurations. This largely aligns with our vision.

They rejoiced over the way the United States gave Kyiv a “proper slap down.” These are clear indications that, far from deterring aggression, the Trump administration is actively emboldening it—at America’s expense.

What Is the Endgame?

Theories abound as to what the Trump administration is trying to achieve. Some believe they see a future where the United States aligns with Russia. There are certainly plenty of comments from Trump’s circle that suggest as much. Mick Mulvaney wrote an op-ed in The Hill hinting at this idea, and Steve Bannon hailed Trump’s press conference meltdown as the dawn of a new future where the U.S. and Russia cooperate against China. Democracy’s Sisyphus has already analyzed that possibility.

Perhaps they genuinely believe they are strengthening a future ally, and Europe is just collateral damage.

But an attempt at a U.S.-Russia alliance seems misguided. Even as an advocate for shifting America’s global strategy, I had hoped that the moral compass would remain. Power matters—but I want a foreign policy where it isn’t the only thing that matters.

Beyond the moral implications of siding with an authoritarian aggressor, it doesn’t even make sense from a strategic standpoint. Aligning with a country that actively seeks to undermine you—both domestically and internationally—is beyond foolish. Even if pulling Russia into an alliance against China were possible, this sycophantic attempt to become more palatable to Russia is the definition of appeasement.

It’s also possible that America First is trying to revive the unilateralism of early U.S. foreign policy—the idea that America should remain neutral and free from entanglements. As Thomas Jefferson once said:

America… must have its separate system of interests, which must not be subordinated to those of Europe.

Early U.S. leaders saw the country as standing above European affairs. But the Trump administration’s approach hardly lifts America “above the fray.” Unilateralism was possible in the early Republic because the United States was too weak to impact global power structures, making it easy for other nations to ignore. Neutrality is no shield when adversaries are actively working to dismantle your influence and sideline you—if not outright destroy you. Even Jefferson, despite his deep hatred for Britain, was willing to side with them against France if necessary to prevent French expansion in North America. As Franklin Roosevelt said during a radio address on July 4, 1941 “The United States will never survive as a happy and fertile oasis of liberty surrounded by a cruel desert of dictatorship”

The other possibility is that there is no grand strategy at all. Trump’s behavior could be entirely driven by ego and his desire to be seen as a dealmaker—combined with his envy of authoritarian rulers. That would be the worst-case scenario. A bad plan is still better than no plan at all. Around Trump, erratic and aggressive behavior is often followed by others scrambling to apply some post-hoc genius strategy to it.

A Golden Opportunity Slipping Away

Whatever the reason, it still feels like a golden opportunity is being lost. Trump accused Zelensky of gambling with World War III. But after the last 40 days, it is hard to reach any conclusion other than that the main chaos agent here is the United States.

The rational and achievable objectives—peace in Ukraine, burden sharing, reduced entanglements—are all being obscured by sloppy execution. Trump may still claim credit if these goals are met, but it doesn’t have to be this way. This chaos actively weakens deterrence and makes Europe less likely to share any burdens in the future.

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